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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
Polycentrism’s Playground: 
Ukraine and Russia’s 
Implausible Deniability
In this post, the first in a series on the Ukrainian crisis, I look 
at the obvious illegality of Russia’s actions in Ukraine – and 
the problems with that obviousness in the pluralistic 
cacophony of international law.
If Russia’s invasion of Ukraine hasn’t violated international 
law, it’s hard to see what would. Which means, 
unfortunately, that it’s hard to see what would.
I. Obvious, Illegal

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After months of protests in Kiev against the pro-Moscow 
government’s rejection of a deal with the European Union – 
protests which increasingly radicalized and were met with 
increasing violence – President Viktor Yanukovych was 
ousted and fled the capital and then the country. It looked, 
for a moment, like the end of Ukraine’s crisis – but then 
Russia intervened militarily, first in Crimea, then in eastern 
Ukraine, giving support to disaffected populations of ethnic 
Russians, Russophones and others unhappy with the new 
Western-oriented regime.
The case for illegality looks clear: Despite denials from 
Moscow, the ‘Green Men’ who supposedly undertook the 
liberation of the Crimean peninsula looked suspiciously like 
Russian special forces, some of whom reportedly had been 
photographed in Georgia in 2008 and, more recently, in 
eastern Ukraine.
There are limited grounds for using force against another 
state, all missing here: authorization by the United Nations, 
self-defense, or invitation. No, no and no: Russia didn’t even 
bother arguing the first two, and the treaties it signed for its 
Black Sea Fleet’s bases certainly didn’t allow Russian troops 
to roam free. The only other justification – humanitarian 
intervention or R2P – looks totally pretextual; there was no 
evidence of threats to Crimean Russians that would meet the 
high threshold that doctrine requires. If we have to argue 
about whether or not Kosovo met the standard, there is no 
way Crimea or even eastern Ukraine could.
For these reasons, the referendum in Crimea looked like 
nothing so much as cover for annexation. Indeed, from a 
customary international legal perspective, even Putin’s initial 
denials that Russia troops were present actually reinforced 
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the legal norm against intervention, though that is cold 
comfort for Kiev.
Now, in eastern Ukraine, the pretexts look just as thin – 
claims based of the recent referendum in Donetsk and 
Luhansk even thinner, especially after the recent Ukrainian 
elections – and while there is greater violence and greater 
instability than there was in Crimea, it seems clear that 
much of it was at least initially ginned up by Russia itself, in a 
form of provocation that would void any claim of protective 
purpose.
II. Kto kogo? Pluralism’s Playground
All this is clear – except it isn’t. The pluralistic, cacophonic 
structure of international law means the West can say
Russia’s acts were illegal, but can’t decide they were, and 
nobody else can either. The US and Europe might be right, 
but they can’t make it right.
Russia’s justifications are factually ridiculous but 
theoretically plausible. Humanitarian intervention is 
designed for exactly this kind of case, just not these facts: 
The fact that we can easily distinguish the Kosovo case 
should just remind us that it needs to be distinguished – 
because there is now a plausible justification for protective 
intervention. (Indeed, armed incursions have long been 
justified to protect small numbers of citizens abroad – the 
practice is known as the Entebbe doctrine, after an Israeli 
incursion into Uganda to rescue 106 hostages. In 1983, the 
US invaded Grenada notionally to protect a few American 
medical students – a considerably smaller group than 
Russians in Crimea.) Russia’s justifications are dubious – in 
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this they resemble the Bush administration’s reasons for 
invading Iraq: all valid in theory, just not in the actual case.
Russia even had an invitation – something Bush never got. 
The West rejected that invitation’s validity, noting that while 
President Yanukovych was ousted through extra-
constitutional means, he no longer held power and had fled. 
But loss of effective control is exactly the condition that 
doctrines supporting democratic and constitutional 
continuity seek to remedy. If you swing a dead constitution 
you will hit any number of countries whose elected leader 
was toppled – and whose successor Western states refused 
to recognize. The real rule is loss of control whose 
legitimacy we accept. Russia didn’t, or at least plausibly 
claimed it didn’t: Pretextual is not the same as illegal. 
(Yanukovych’s usefulness to Russia was of short duration; 
Moscow belatedly decided to support the recent Ukrainian 
elections and work with the new authorities; but his 
presidency served Putin’s purpose.)
Even the obvious falsehood that Russian troops weren’t 
involved the operation isn’t novel. This is not the first time a 
major power has used such a laughably legal ruse: During 
the Korean War, the People’s Republic of China flooded 
armies of its soldiers into North Korea – all of whom were, 
notionally, volunteers outside the state’s control. Nobody 
believed this obvious fiction, but it did allow the Chinese to 
implausibly deny they were intervening, which was the 
point.
None of these scenarios really are comparable – the 
differences between the permanent ‘protective’ annexation 
of Crimea and Israel’s lightning in-and-out raid on Entebbe 
overwhelm any thin, rhetorical analogy. Even the invasion of 
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Iraq looks thickly sourced in international law by 
comparison. Unlike its 2008 invasion of Georgia, Moscow’s 
arguments in Ukraine don’t stand up to scrutiny, or even 
squinting.
But implausible defiance may be enough: Facts are 
distracting, because the only fact that matters is not the 
truth about who those armed men were, but who gets to 
decide. It’s rather like this blogpost: I could quite easily make 
the argument that Russia’s actions are illegal, and I would be 
right – but I don’t have the authority to make it so, and I 
would be wrong not to admit that. The norms at stake here 
are no “vaguer than typical norms of international law”, but 
there is no authoritative way to determine that Russia’s 
actions – however insupportable – are illegal. The puerile, 
playground retort ‘says who’ says a great deal about 
international law’s indeterminacy.
• In my next post, I’ll continue this line of argument, asking who is 
to blame and (in the spirit of an earlier rejuvenator of the 
Moscow-based geopolitical project) what is to be done.
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